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852 IN RE L. A. CouNTY PIONEER SociETY [40 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 22217. In Bank. May 5, 1953.] 
In re LOS ANGELES COUNTY PIONEER SOCIE'l'Y, a 
Corporation, in Process of Voluntary Dissolution. LOS 
ANGELES COUNTY PIONEER SOCIETY et al., Ap-
pellants, v. HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF SOUTHERN 
CALIFORNIA (a Corporation) et al., Respondents; 
'l'HE PEOPLE et al., Interveners and Respondents. 
[1] Judgments-Res Judicata-Persons Concluded.-A declaratory 
judgment is res judicata only against persons who were par-
ties or in privity with parties thereto. 
[2] Appeal-Decisions Appealable-Finality.--The label of a judg-
ment as "interlocutory" is not determinative on the question of 
whether it is appealable, since it is the substance and effect 
of a judgment that determines its finality. 
[3] !d.-Decisions Appealable-Finality.-Ordinarily an appeal 
lies only from a final judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 963.) 
[4] !d.-Decisions Appealable-Finality.-Where no issue is left 
for future consideration except the fact of compliance or non-
compliance with the first decree, that decree is final, but where 
anything further in the nature of judicial action on part of 
court is essential to a final determination of rights of parties, 
the decree is interlocutory. 
[5] !d.-Decisions Appealable-Finality.-Where judgment pro-
vides that corporation should account to court for performance 
of its duties as trustee, that new trustee should be appointed 
to replace the corporation, and that court would from time 
to time "make such other and further orders as are competent, 
lawful and proper for a complete determination of this action," 
such judgment, in view of this reservation of questions for 
future decision, is not final as to such corporation and hence 
is not appealable by it. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Judgments, § 215; Am.Jur., Judgments, § 219 
et seq. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 39 et seq.; Am.Jur., Ap-
peal and Error, § 22 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Judgments, § 415; [2] Appeal and 
Error, § 29; [3] Appeal and Error, § 26; [ 4, 5] Appeal and Error, 
§31; [6] Charities, §18; [7] Charities, §34; [8] Charities, §25; 
[9, 10] Charities, § 40; [11] Charities, § 36; [12, 13, 17, 18, 20, 23] 
Charities, § 30; [14] Charities, § 32; [15, 22] Charities, § 35; [16] 
Charities, §39; [19] Courts, §§103, 104; [21] Charities, §4; [24] 
Charities, § 29. 
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[6] Charities- Historical Commemoration and Research.- The 
commemoration of historical events and the collection and 
preservation of data of historical interest are for the educa-
tional and recreational benefit of the community as a whole 
and are recognized charitable purposes. 
[7] !d.-Charitable Corporations.-Since members of a charitable 
organization often participate in its activities with the object 
of making new friends and participating in pleasurable group 
activities in the course of carrying out the charitable pur-
poses of the organization, the incidental social activities of 
a corporation organized for the purpose of collection and 
preservation of data touching the early history of the state 
do not deprive such corporation of its charitable character. 
[8] Id.-Beneficiaries.-A gift or devise to a society organized for 
a charitable purpose without a declaration of the use to which 
the gift is to be put is given in trust to carry out the objects 
for which the organization was created. 
[9] Id.-Actions-Parties.-The attorney general is a necessary 
party to proceedings affecting the disposition of assets of a 
charitable trust. 
[10] Id.-Actions-Parties.-Since Corp. Code, § 10207, expressly 
makes it the duty of the attorney general to protect assets 
held by a charitable corporation, it is proper to allow him 
to intervene in dissolution proceedings of such a corporation 
and to challenge its claim that the assets could be distributed 
for the personal benefit of its members. 
[11] !d.-Administration and ControL-Under Corp. Code, §§ 9505, 
10207, a charitable corporation is subject to the same super-
vision by the attorney general as is a nonprofit corporation 
holding its assets subject to a charitable trust, and deviations 
from the purposes stated in the corporation's articles are thus 
subject to the same corrective measures that would be taken 
against a trustee of a charitable trust that similarly refused 
to carry out its duties. 
[12] !d.-Trustees-Abandonment of Trust-New Trustee.-Con-
duct of charitable corporation, organized for purpose of col-
lection and preservation of data touching early history of 
state, in amending its bylaws to close its membership and 
provide that existing members have a proprietary interest in 
its assets, in bringing a declaratory relief action to obtain a 
ruling that the assets are not held in trust, paying attorneys' 
fees for both parties, in selling its assets, in commencing dis-
[6] Validity, as for a charitable purpose, of trust for dissemina-
tion or preservation of material of historical or other educational 
interest or value, note, 12 A.L.R.2d 849. See, also, Cal.Jur., Chari-
ties, ? 15; Am.Jur., Charities, § 63 et seq. 
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solution proceedings, etc., demonstrates that it has abused and 
abandoned its trust and sustains determination of trial court 
that a new trustee should be appointed. 
[13] !d.-Trustees-Abandonment of Trust.-If the trustees of a 
charitable trust abandon or abuse their trust, equity will 
correct the abuses and remove the offenders. 
[14] !d.-Corporations as Donees.-Members of an incorporated 
society organized for charitable purposes cannot appropriate 
to themselves the assets previously acquired by the device of 
renouncing the purposes expressed in its articles. 
[15] Id.- Dissolution of Charitable Corporation.- A charitable 
corporation cannot dissolve and distribute its assets among 
its members. 
[16] Id.-Actions-Issues.-Attorney general intervening in dis-
solution proceedings of a charitable corporation is not required 
to give such corporation an opportunity to comply with its 
articles of incorporation prior to filing the petition in inter-
vention, which alleged that the corporation failed to comply 
with its articles, where the corporation failed to put the ques-
tion in issue by stipulating that such petition could be filed 
and filing an answer denying that its assets were held for 
charitable purposes. 
[17] !d.-Trustees-Abandonment of Trust-New Trustee.-At-
torney general's power under Corp. Code, § 10207, to obtain 
appointment of a successor trustee where charitable corpora-
tion has abandoned trust by institution of dissolution pro-
ceedings is not limited to cases in which assets of such cor-
poration have been distributed, and hence a termination of 
the dissolution proceeding by the corporation would not pre-
clude the attorney general from exercising this power. 
[18] Id.- Trustees- Abandonment of Trust- New Trustee.-
Where property is conveyed to a trustee with an express 
declaration of a charitable purpose by the donor, on failure 
of the original trustee a court of equity will appoint a suc-
cessor trustee to carry out the charitable purpose expressed 
by the donor. 
[19] Courts-Decisions as Precedents-Power to Overrule Deci-
sions.-Judicial decisions may be overruled and dicta disap-
proved without violating either the due process clause or the 
contract clause of the United States Constitution. 
[20] Charities-Trustees-Abandonment of Trust-New Trustee.-
A court of equity should appoint a successor trustee to carry 
out the charitable intent of a donor whether the charitable 
purpose is found in the terms of the conveyance to a corpora-
tion or in the latter's articles, or whether the failure of the 
corporation is through dissolution or other disqualification. 
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[21] Id.-.;,Attitude of Court.-The policy of law in favo:r of char-
itable gifts requires a court to earryout the dominant purpose 
of the donor to make a charita,ble gift for the purposes ex-
pressed in the articles of the original corporate donee. 
[22] Id.- Dissolution of Charitable Corporation- Reversion of 
Property to Donors.~Property donated to a corporation .for 
charitable purposes will not revert to the don'Ors 'Or their 
heirs on dissolution of the corporation, since if the donors had 
desired a reversion in such contingency they could have in-
serted clauses to that effect in their gifts, and since, in ease 
the dissolution should occur many years after the det.tth of 
the donors, it would be extremely difficult or impossible to 
determine the heirs entitled to the property. (Disapproving 
dictum to contrary in People v. President and Trustees of. Col-
lege of California, 3B Cal. 166, 174.) 
[23] !d.-Trustees-Abandonment of Trust-:-New 'l'rustee.-A his-
torical society is qualified to act as successor trustee of the 
assets of a charitable corporation which failed to comply 
with purpose of organization to· . .collect and . preserve data 
touching early history of state, where such society is also a 
charitable corporation and is. actively engaged in collecting 
and preserving material of historic interest in southern part 
of state. 
[24] Id.-Trustees-De:iiniteness of Powers.-.An order of court 
appointing a historical society as successor trustee of a charita,ble 
corporation which fails to. comply with purposes of trust prop-
erly limits the duties of such society. to the provisions of the 
articles of the charitable corporation that it is organized for 
the purpose of. coilecting and preserving data to,uching early 
history of state, where sueh limitation conforms to the wishes 
of the donors of the assets. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of .LO!! .An-
geles .County appointing trustee of a charitable corporation. 
James H. Pope, Judge pro tem;* Affirmed. 
Morris Lavine for Appellant Los Angeles Copnty Pioneer 
Society. 
Roy Howard for Appellant Lelande. 
Lawler, Felix & Hall and Oscar Lawler for Respondents. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney G(lneral, and Edward Sum-
ner, Deputy Attorney General, for Interveners .. and Re-
spondents. 
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Connell. 
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TRAYNOR, J.--·Los Angeles County Pioneer Society and 
Harry Lelande, a member thereof, appeal separately from 
an order appointing the Historical Society of Southern Cali-
fornia trustee of all property in the possession of Pioneer. 
The order was entered after the trial court determined that 
Pioneer held its property for charitable purposes, that Pioneer 
had repudiated its trust, and that appointment of Historical 
as trustee. was necessary to carry out the purposes of the trust. 
We have concluded that the order is amply supported by 
the evidence and must be affirmed. 
Pioneer was founded in 1897 as an unincorporated associa-
tion of pioneers living in Los Angeles County, with about 
600 members. In 1910 the members incorporated as a non-
profit corporation. Over the years membership decreased 
until in 1941 there were less than 100 members. In that year 
and later years Mrs. Emma Stoltenberg, a member of Pioneer, 
made substantial g·ifts to Pioneer and on her death in 1946 
left additional sums to Pioneer by will. Her gifts amounted 
to about $53,000. The money was used to purchase a building 
that was used for meetings of Pioneer and rented for com-
mercial purposes. The membership continued to decrease and 
in 1948 the members decided to dissolve the corporation, dis-
tribute the assets among themselves, and continue the organ-
ization as an unincorporated association to carry out the pur-
pose~ Q:Lthe articles of incorporation. . .••... 
. To determine whether its assets were impressed with'1t'\ 
trust, Pioneer filed an action for declaratory relief against.-/ 
a me1nber of the society; On June 1; I949;3udgmen"fwas-en: 
~ereddeclariii!ft11arno trust of any kind was impressed upon 
the assets. Thereafter the membership, by a petition signed 
by 53 of the 58 members, agreed to dissolve the corporation. 
The assets were converted to cash and, since the property 
owned by the corporation had greatly appreciated in value, 
$95,243.54 was realized. Pioneer then petitioned the superior 
court for judicial supervision of the dissolution. (Corp. Code, 
§ 4607.) Several members of Pioneer objected to the dissolu-
tion. Pursuant to stipulation of the parties, the attorney 
general filed a petition in intervention, alleging that Pioneer 
held its assets in trust and praying that a new trustee be ap-
pointed on the ground that Pioneer had abandoned its trust. 
The court ordered that the assets be impounded. On Ma;y 19, 
J950""\he court entered judgment that Pioneer was a charitaJ)Te···~ 
/corporation, that its assets were dedicated to charitable pur- / 
1'.Jl.~ses, that it bad abandoned its trust and was threa~~~1l~.tl~ . / 
< '" ~~";;""A~' p 
May 1953] IN RE L.A. CouNTY PIONEER SoCIETY 857 
[40 C.2d 852; 257 P.2d 1] 
to divert the assets to the private benefit of its members, and; 
·. that appointment of a new trustee was necessary. The judg-
',ment was entitled "interlocutory judgment" and the court 
retained jurisdiction to make such further orders as were 
necessary to a complete determination of the action. Pioneer 
did not appeal. On October 18, 1950, after a further hearing, 
the court appointed Historical trustee and ordered the im-
pounded assets turned over to it. The present appeals are 
from this order. 
The first question presented is whether the trial court cor-
rectly determined that all of the assets of Pioneer were given 
and received for charitable purposes and held by Pioneer 
for those purposes. 
Pioneer contends that the declaratory relief judgment is 
res judicata as to the question whether Pioneer holds its assets 
for charitable purposes, and characterizes the opposition to 
the dissolution proceedings as a collateral attack on the former 
adjudication, relying upon City of San Diego v. Snperior 
Court, 36 Cal.2d 483 [224 P.2d 685]. Historical, on the other 
hand, contends that the declaratory relief action was collusive 
and a fraud on the court, pointing out that all evidence 
therein was presented by stipulation, that Pioneer paid the 
attorneys' fees for both plaintiff and defendant in that action, 
and that the two opposing attorneys subsequently joined 
forces and together represented Pioneer at the trial of the 
dissolution proceedings. (See Guardianship of Jacobson, 30 
Cal.2d 326, 333 [182 P.2d 545] .) [1] It is unnecessary to 
pass upon Historical's contention, since the declaratory relief 
judgment is res judicata only against persons who were 
parties or in privity with parties thereto. (Rest. Judg-
ments, § 77; Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal.2d 807, 
813 [122 P.2d 892] ; City & County of Denver v. Denver Land 
Co., 85 Colo. 198, 201 [274 P. 743].) The attorney general 
was not a party to the declaratory relief action and was not 
in privity with parties thereto and, accordingly, he was not 
bound by that adjudication and was free to contend in the 
dissolution proceedings that Pioneer held its assets for chari-
table purposes. 
'fhe attorney general and Historical contend that the "inter-
locutory judgment'' entered on 1\l[ay 19th was an appealable 
judgment that became final through the failure of Pioneer to 
appeal therefrom, and that it is now res judicata that Pioneer 
holds its assets for charitable purposes. [2] The label of 
the judgment as "interlocutory" is not determinative upon 
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this question, since it is the substance and effect of a judg-
ment that determines its finality. (Lyon v. Goss, 19 Cal.2d 
659, 669-670 [123 P.2d 11] ; Peninsula Prop. Co. v. County 
of Santa Cruz, 106 Cal.App.2d 669, 678 [235 P.2d 635].) 
[3] An appeal lies only from a final judgment, except in 
certain cases not applicable here. (Code Civ. Proc., § 963.) 
[ 4] "As a general test, which must be adapted to the par-
ticular circumstances of the individual case, it may be said 
that where no issue is left for future consideration except 
the fact of compliance or noncompliance with the terms of 
the first decree, that decree is final, but where anything 
further in the nature of judicial action on the part of the 
court is essential to a final determination of the rights of the 
parties, the decree is interlocutory." (Lyon v. Goss, supra, 19 
Cal.2d 659, 670.) [5] In the present case the May 19th 
judgment provided that Pioneer should account to the court 
for the performance of its duties as trustee, that a new trustee 
should be appointed to replace Pioneer, and that the court 
would from time to time ''make such other and further orders 
as are competent, lawful and proper for a complete de-
termination of this action.'' The assets of Pioneer were im-
pounded by the court on February 15, 1950, but it was not 
ordered that they be turned over to Historical until the order 
of October 18th. Since the court expressly reserved for 
future decision questions regarding the rights, duties, and 
liabilities of Pioneer, the May 19th judgment was not final 
as to Pioneer and was not appealable. (Erickson v. Boothe, 
35 Cal.2d 108, 109 [216 P.2d 454] ; Lacey v. Bertone, 33 Cal. 
2d 649, 653 [203 P.2d 755] ; Lyon v. Goss, supra, 19 Cal.2d 
659, 671; see cases collected in 4 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, 
pp. 184-193.) The conclusion that Pioneer could not appeal 
from the judgment of May 19th disposes of the contention 
of appellant Lelande that the appeal by Pioneer must be 
dismissed because it was taken too late. 
Since neither the declaratory relief judgment nor the 
May 19th judgment settled the issue whether :Pton~~r~hel!i 
its assets for charitable pu~pos"es,Jthe determinative question::\ 
whether substantial evidence supports the order of October ' \ 
18th. The__a1:ticles ofjncorporation Pioneer provide: \ 
"That the purpose for which this corporation is formed is to ') 
cultivate social intercoul'se and friendship among its members, 
to collect and preserve data touching the early history of } 
Los Angeles County and the State of California, to collect and J 
preserve articles, specimens and material things illustratiy~ 
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nr dewoHstratiYe of tit<' eu~tomc:, modes and habits of the 
afon~;;;aid times in snid State; to perpet.natr the memory of 
those who, by their labors and heroism, eontributed to make 
the history of said County and State; and in furtherance of 
said purpose [to do all acts] necessary and convenient for 
the promotion of the aforesaid purpose ; and to exist as a 
social corporation under the provisions of the laws of the 
State of California, covering such corporations, and not for 
pecuniary profit.'' In Pioneer's answer to the petition in 
intervention it is alleged that between 1945 and 1950 Pioneer 
engaged in acquiring material concerning the pioneers and 
founders of r~os Angeles County and the State of California; 
that Pioneer perpetuated the memory of those who by their 
labors and heroism contributed to make the history of the 
county and the state; that the members attended a meeting 
at the Biltmore Hotel in 1948 to honor the memory of the 
dead pioneers during the discovery of gold in California; 
that Pioneer participated in the erection of a plaque at Ingle-
wood, California, to mark the site of the first school building 
in Inglewood; that Pioneer held four picnics at which time 
the memory of the former pioneers and founders of Los 
Angeles County were commemorated; that in 1947 Pioneer 
celebrated the 166th anniversary of the founding of the city 
of Los Angeles and the members dressed in costumes of the 
Spanish period; that at the monthly meetings talks and dis-
ctlssions were held recollecting the activities and labors of 
the pioneers and their memories were perpetuated and 
honored; and that many further and additional activities 
were engaged in pursuant to the purposes set forth in the 
articles of incorporation. 
[6] The commemoration of historical events and the col-
lection and preservation of data of historical interest are for 
the educational and recreational benefit of the community as 
a whole and are recognized charitable purposes. (Rest., 
'rrusts, § 374; Estate of Entin, 81 Cal.App.2d 76, 81 [183 
P.2d 304j; In re Centenn£al & Memorial Assn. of Valley Forge, 
235 Pa. 206, 211 r83 A. 683] ; Steenis v. Appleton, 230 
Wis. 530, 533 [284 N.W. 492] ; JJiissour-i Historical Society v. 
Academy of Sdence, 94 Mo. 459, 466 [8 S.W. 346]; 12 A.L.R. 
2d 888-896.) By the allegations in its answer, Pioneer conceded 
that it was actively engaged in carrying· out such objectives. 
Even if the concessions in the answer are disregarded, 
the articles of incorporation supply sufficient evidence to sus-
taiu tbe action of tl1e trial conrL It may be assumed that if 
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thA only purpose of PionAer were "to cultivate social inter-
(~ourse and friendship among its members" it would not be a 
!~haritable eorporation (Ree 2 Bogert, Trusts and.J':t:l,!Stees, 
j_3§0, and ease;; cited .. thereil1.2., but it is clear from a reading ~. 
/of the articles as a whole that the social purposes of Pioneer. 
l .. ~.are.incidental to its public and charitable purposes. [7J si~~~ 
members of a charitable organization often participate in its 
activities with the object of making new friends and par-
ticipating in pleasurable group activities in the course of 
carrying out the charitable purposes of the organization, the 
incidental social activities of Pioneer do not deprive it of its 
charitable character. (See Yo7tng v. Boy Scouts of America, 
9 Cal.App.2d 760, 764 [51 P.2d 191] ; Estate of Wirt, 124 
Cal.App. 7, 11 [12 P.2d 95] .) The same conclusion was reached 
in Estate of Dol, 186 Cal. 64, 65 [198 P. 1039], where this 
court held that a gift to Pioneer was invalid under the mort-
main statute ( Civ. Code, § 1313, now Pro b. Code, § 41) on 
the ground that Pioneer was a charitable corporation. It is 
not necessary to determine here whether the Dol decision is 
res judicata as to the issue whether Pioneer is a charitable 
corporation, as urged by the attorney general, since the action 
of the trial court in the present case may be sustained by 
g·iving the Dol decision the effect of stare decisis only. 
Pioneer contends that the gifts of Mrs. Stoltenberg were 
for the benefit of the members of Pioneer personally and 
were not received for charitable purposes. Her will provided: 
''the Balance of my estate to be given to the Pioneer Society 
Meeting at the Biltmore Hotel.'' The gifts during her life-
time were subject to an oral understanding that the money 
would be used to purchase a permanent home for the society. 
Pioneer erroneously assumes that the gift could not be for 
charitable purposes..-unlesLthe . instr:gm~11t g:f~if.L~~m:~ly 
so provided. [8]/" [A] devise to a society organized for~ --~-- ,,, ""¥ \ /·clraritaotE\··purpose without a declaration of the use to which ) 
// the gift is to be put is given in trust to carry out the obj~ 
\ for wbiclt . .th.tl organization was created. •;c(Esfate oTTflip-
···~, 75 Cal.A'pp:2etzf:2tr,~.{l~l·F:~d 567]; Estate of 
McDole, 215 Cal. 328, 332 [10 P.2d 75] .) Similarly, in 
the present case the gift of Mrs. Stoltenberg in her will was 
for the purposes expressed in Pioneer's articles, and the 
gifts during her lifetime were for a building to be used to 
carry out those purposes. 
The conclusion that Pioneer held its assets for charitable 
purposes disposes of Pioneer's contention that the trial court 
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Rhould not have allowed the attorney general to become a 
party to the dissolution proceedings. [9, 10] The attorney 
general is a necessary party to proceedings affecting the 
disposition of assets of a charitable trust (People v. CogsweU, 
113 Cal. 129, 136 [45 P. 270, 35 L.R.A. 269); Society of Calif. 
Pioneers v. McElt·oy, 63 Cal.App.2d 332, 342 [146 P.2d 962] ; 
Rest., Trusts, § 391; cases collected in 14 C.J.S. Chari-
ties, § 62b), and when assets are held by a charitable 
eorporation, as here, the duty to protect such assets is ex-
pressly placed upon the attorney general by the Corpora-
tions Code. ( § 10207.) Accordingly, it was not error to allow 
the attorney general to intervene in the dissolution proceed-
ings and challenge the claim of Pioneer that the assets could 
be distributed for the personal benefit of its members. 
The next question to be determined is whether the trial 
eourt was justified in appointing a successor trustee. Pioneer 
eontends that the only remedy available to the attorney gen-
eral was an order of the trial court directing Pioneer to 
eomply with its articles. As previously pointed out, substan-
tial evidence supports the finding of the trial court that 
Pioneer held its assets for charitable purposes. [11] Under 
the Corporations Code a charitable corporation is subject to 
the same supervision by the attorney general as is a nonprofit 
corporation holding its assets subject to a charitable trust 
/~§~&e&;-10207;. see 2§._ §Q:Cal~"J:J.R~y, . 8j1)) and deviat1on1f", 
' from the purposes stated in Pioneer's articles are thus subject · 
to the same corrective measures that would be taken against a 
trustee of a charitable trust that similarly refused to carry 
·~1t its duties. 
·Pioneer aniimded its by-laws to close its membership and 
provide that existing members had a proprietary interest in 
its assets; 1 it brought a declaratory relief action to obtain 
a rnling that the assets were not held in trust, paying the 
Ht.tornr>~' fr>r>s for· both partiesthereto; it sold its assets and 
rrilured its property to cash ; it commenced dissolution pro-
1 By-laws adopted May 4, 1948, provided: "The class of acUve member-
ships shall have exclusive proprietary rights to the property and assets 
of the corporation and the voting power of the corporation shall be 
vested exclusively in the holders of active memberships. Each active 
member shall be entitled to one vote. 
''The social memberships shall have no proprietary rig·hts whatsoever 
in the property or assets of the corporation and shall not have any voting 
rights .... 
''The present paid up memberships of this corporation shall constitute 
the active memberships of the corporation and those who hereafter be· 
come members shall be social members only.'' 
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ceedings; and it maintained in the trial court, in a petition 
for writs of prohibition and mandate,2 and on this appeal 
lha~)t~~ assets are not held for charitable purp~ses. 
[12] Pioneer's course of conduct throughout these proceed-
ings thus demonstrates that it has abused and abandoned its 
trust and amply supports the determination of the. trial coup;/ 
\ . .lhl!t a new trustee should be appointed. (Corp. Code, § 10207 ; 
Estate of Grblny, 147 Neb. 117, 131 [22 N.W.2d 488]; At-
tor·ney General v. Ar·rnstrong, 231 Mass. 196, 214 [120 N.E. 
678]; Rest., Trusts, §§ 387, 399.) [13] "If the trustees 
abandon or in any way abuse their trust, equity will cor-
rect the abuses and remove the offenders." (People v. 
Cogswell, supra, 113 Cal. 129, 141; see Scott on Trusts, § 387.) 
Pioneer invokes cases where the evidence showed that the 
corporation involved was a nonprofit corporation that existed 
for the private benefit of the members thereof and that the 
assets were not held for charitable purposes. In such cases 
it is properly held that the assets are distributed among the 
members upon dissolution (Corp. Code, § 9801; see Brown v. 
La Societe Francaise DeB. JJiutuelle, 138 Cal. 475, 477 [71 
P. 516] ; Abalian v. Townsend Social Center, Inc., 112 Cal. 
App.2d 441, 449 [246 P.2d 965]; 168 A.L.R. 956), but those 
decisions are not controlling here, since substantial evidence 
supports the determination of the trial court that Pioneer 
holds its assets for the charitable purposes expressed in its 
articles of incorporation. 
[14] Pioneer points out that in 1948 its by-laws were 
amended to provide that active members ''shall have exclusive 
proprietary rights in the property and assets of the corpora-
tion.'' Whatever may have been the prospective effect of this 
amendment, it does not appear from the record that any 
donations were received by Pioneer after the amendment' and"" 
.of·B4Ul:§e~+t"ne m~embers oCP1oneer could not appropriate to \ 
themselves the assets previously acquired by the device of/ 
·· rfpouncing the purposes expressed in its articles. ~ / 
Pioneer contends thafl:ipon··dissolution the u:s~rets""must 
be distributed among its members and any holding allow-
2The petition, 2 Civil 18328, was denied by the District Court of 
Appeal without opinion on January 11, 1951, and a hearing was denied 
by this comt on March 8, 1951. Pioneer contended that it "was 
organized for the private interest and advantage of its members,'' that 
''the fair and proper thing to do was to dissolve the corporation and 
distribute the assets," and that "neither the public at large, nor the 
community of Los Angeles'' had ''any interest in the affairs of peti-
tioner.'' 
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ing the assets to he transferred t.o annthel' charitable cor-
poration would he a eonfisrmtinn of the members' property 
in contravention of the F'ourteenth Amendment. The con-
tention is without merit, since the members of Pioneer have 
not at any time bad any right to receive the property. 
[15] A charitable eorporation eannot dissolve and distribute 
its assets among its members. (See Ashton v. Dashaway Assn., 
84 Cal. 61, 69 [22 P. 660, 23 P. 1091, 7 L.R.A. 809]; Zollmann, 
Ameriean Law of Charities, § 476.) Thus in a ease apposite 
to the present ease, the Centennial and Memorial Assoeiation 
of Valley Forge, a eharitable eorporation, received eontribu-
tions to perpetuate and preserve the site upon whieh George 
Washington had eneamped in winter quarters. Upon dissolu-
tion, a member eontended that the funds should be distributed 
among the members of the eorporation, but the eourt held that 
no individual right to the funds existed and that the prop-
erty should go to another eharitable eorporation with pur-
poses akin to those of the dissolved eorporation. (In re Cen-
tennial & 111 ernorial Assn. of Valley Forge, supra, 235 Pa. 206, 
213; see In 1"e 111t. B'inai Hospital, 250 N.Y. 103, 113 (164 N.E. 
871) .) 
_[16],/Pioneer eontends that in proeeedings under seetion 
J0207 a eharitable eorporation must be given an opportunity 
to eorrect its deviation from its articles, as it would if the 
proceeding were in quo warranto. ( § 4691.) Pioneer's ~on­
tention eomes too late. The attorney general's petition in 
intervention alleged that Pioneer had failed to comply with 
its articles and prayed that the court distribute Pioneer's 
assets to a trustee willing to comply . w~th the ch~:tritll,bk ' 
·purp()ses expressed in Pioneer's article~; 'Pioneer stipulated 
that the petition of the attorney general could be filed and 
filed an answer denying that its assets were held for charitable 
purposes, alleging that it had at all times complied with its 
artieles, and praying that its assets "be distributed pro rata 
among the members of the Los Angeles County Pioneer 
Society.'' By the stipulation and the answer Pioneer failed 
to put in issue in the trial court the question whether the 
attorney general was obliged to give Pioneer an opportunity 
prior to the petition in intervention to comply with its articles. 
On January 26, 1953, at the oral argument of this case, 
Pioneer filed a motion to remand the ease to the trial court 
''for the purpose of making a further order in the above en-
titled case to permit the society to continue to operate as 
a society and to revoke its former petition to dissolve the 
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eorporation and further to restore to the society the funds 
of which the Rociety was divested.'' Pioneer alleged in its 
motion that on ,January 19, 1953, the members of Pioneer 
voted to revoke their petition to dissolve and decided that 
they would comply with the provisions of the articles.3 
Pioneer's position is that under section 4606 of the Corpora-
tions Code it could terminate dissolution proceedings at any 
time before distribution of the assets, that the assets of Pioneer 
have not been distributed,4 and that the trial court does not 
have power to transfer the assets of Pioneer to Historical if 
dissolution proceedings are terminated. [17] The attorney 
general, however, has power to obtain app~intment of a suc-
cessor trustee under section 10207 of the Corporations Code 
(see People v. Cogswell, supra, 113 Cal. 129, 141-142) and 
there is nothing therein limiting the power of the attorney 
general to cases where the assets of the charitable corporation 
have been distributed. It is true that in the present case 
Pioneer's abandonment of its trust was brought to light in the 
dissolution proceeding, but it does not follow that termina-
tion of the dissolution proceeding by Pioneer would establish 
that the trust assets should be returned to Pioneer. 
Pioneer contends that even if it is held that neither Pioneer 
nor its members may receive the assets, the trial court should 
have distributed the assets to the heirs of Mrs. Stoltenberg 
and not to Historical. We will assume that Pioneer is entitled 
to /raise this point. [18] In cases where property is con-
veyed to a trustee with an express declaration of a charitable 
purpose by the donor; a court of equity will appoint a suc-
cessor trustee to carry out the charitable purpose expressed by 
the donor upon failure of the original trustee (Fay v. Howe, 
136 Cal. 599, 603 [69 P. 423] ; Estate of Upham, 127 Cal. 90, 
94 [59 P. 315]; 14 C.J.S. Charities, § 27), and Historical 
contends that these cases govern here. But in cases where, 
as here, property is conveyed without restriction to a charitable 
"The motion was not made until about 32 months after the interlocutory 
judgment, 27 months after the order appealed from, and 6 months after 
the District Court of Appeal affirmed the order. During this period 
Pioneer's attention was repeatedly called to its status as a charitable 
corporation. 
'The order of October 18, 1950, provided that Historical "is hereby 
appointed trustee of all property ... for which the Los Angeles County 
Pioneer Society is accountable as Trustee" and orders all persons having 
assets or records of Pioneer to forthwith turn such assets over to His-
torical. Execution of the order has been stayed pending outcome of this 
appeal. The assets have been impounded and are in the custody of the 
Farmers and Merchants National Bank of Los Angeles. 
May 1953] IN RE L.A. CouNTY PIONEER SociETY 865 
[40 C.2d 852; 257 P.2d 1] 
•·orporation and t!H• dwritahk intent of the donor is ;mcer-
taiued by refrrenw• to tlw dmritab!e purposes of the donee, 
the courts have had more difficulty. Some decisions state that 
upon dissolutiou of the corporatio11 the property reverts to 
the donor or his heirs (see Mormon Clw.rch v. Unded States, 
186 U.S. 1, 47 [34 L.Ecl. 478]; Matt v. Danville Seminary, 
129 Ill. 403,416 [21 N.E. 927] ), and a dictum in an early case 
indicates that that rule would be followed in this jurisdiction, 
at least as to real property. (People v. President &; Trustees 
of the College of' Calij'orm·a (1869), 38 Cal. 166, 174; cf. Vic-
toria Hospital Assn. v. All Persons, 169 Cal. 455, 464 [147 
P. 124] .) [19] Pioneer contends that the Constitution of the 
United States compels us to follow here the dictum in the Col-
lege of California case; it is settled, however, that judicial de-
cisions may be overruled and dicta disapproved without violat-
ing either the due process clause or the contract clause of the 
United States Constitution. (Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 
U.S. 444, 450-451 [44 S.Ct. 197, 68 L.Ed. 382]; Alferitz v. 
Borgwardt, 126 Cal. 201, 208-209 [58 P. 460).) Accordingly, 
we are free to reexamine the dictum in the College of Cali-
fornia case. 
Decisions holding that g·ifts to charities revert to the donors 
upon dissolution have been subjected to severe criticism (see 
Simes, 'fhe Law of .B'uture Interests, § 185; Gray, 'l'he Rule 
Against Perpetuities [4th ed.}, § 51.1; Turrentine, Sugges-
tions for Revision of PTovisions of' the Califon~ia Civil Code 
RegaTcling Future Interests, 21 Cal.L.Rev. 1, 14), and other 
states reach a contrary result. (In re Centennial &; Memorial 
Assn. of Valley Forge, supra, 235 Pa. 206, 213; McAlhany v. 
Jlftrr·ray, 89 S.C. 440, 446 [71 S.E. 1025] ; see, also, Wilson v. 
Leary, 120 N.C. 90, 94 [26 S.E. 630, 50 Am.St.Rep. 778, 38 
L.R.A. 240] ; Hopkins v. Cr·os9ley, 138 Mich. 561, 566 [101 
N.W. 822].) [20] vVe have concluded that the latter rule should 
be followed and that a court of equity should appoint a suc-
cessor trustee to carry out the charitable intent of the donor 
whether the charitable purpose is found in the terms of the 
conveyance to the corporation or in the articles thereof, or 
whether the failure of the corporatig]l i~ through dissolu-
tion or other disqualification. [21H The policy of the law 
in favor of charitable gifts requires a court to carry out 
the dominant purpose of the donor to make a charitable gift 
\Jor the purposes expressed in the articles of the original cor-
40 C.2d-28 
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(See Rstate of Tnrrant, 38 Cal.2d 42, 49 [237 
P.2il 505, 28 A.Idi.2d 419] ; Estate of Loring, 29 Cal.2d 423, 
436 [175 P.2d 5241; Estate of Scrirnger, 188 CaL 158, 166 
[206 P. 65] .) [22] If the donors of property to a charitable 
corporation wish the property to revert upon dissolution, they 
may insert clauses to that effect in their gifts. (See Estate 
of Randall, 341 Pa. 501 [19 A.2d 272]; Bogert, Trusts and 
'rrustees, § 419.) If the right of reverter is not expressly 
reserved, recognition of a right of reverter by the courts 
would amount to a mere windfall since by the original 
gift the donors indicated that they preferred the property to 
be used to carry out the charitable purposes of the donee 
rather than go to themselves or to their heirs. A transfer 
of the assets to the donors or their heirs would thus conflict 
with the policy that the expressed purpose of the donors should 
be carried out so far as possible. (See Estate of Lefranc, 38 
Cal.2d 289, 296 [239 P.2d 617].) Finally, recognition of 
the right of reverter presents grave practical difficulties, 
since in many cases dissolution of the charitable corporation 
will occur many years after the death of the donors of its 
assets and it will be extremely difficult or impossible to de-
termine the heirs entitled to the property. For the foregoing 
reasons, the dictum in People v. President &; Trustees of the 
College of California, supra, is disapproved. The trial court 
therefore properly appointed a trustee in the present case. 
[23] Pioneer contends that Historical is not qualified to 
act as trustee of the assets. Even if it is assumed that this 
question can be raised by Pioneer (see Society of Calif. 
Pioneers v. McElroy, supra, 63 Cal.App.2d 332, 342), the 
selection of Historical as trustee is supported by the record. 
Historical is a charitable corporation first organized in 1883 
and incorporated in 1891. It has 492 members and is actively 
engaged in collecting and preserving material of historic 
interest in Southern California. The order appointing His-
torical trustee provides that it shall hold the transferred assets 
as trustee for the same purposes as those expressed in Pioneer's 
articles. If Historical does not faithfully perform its duty 
as trustee, the attorney general will institute appropriate 
proceedings to correct the noncompliance. 
[24] Appellant Lelande, although not questioning His-
torical's fitness to act as trustee, contends that the order ap-
pointing Historical trustee should have defined Historical's 
duties in more detail. The order of the court followed the 
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provisiOns of Pioneer's articles. 5 Lelande points out that 
before it was appointed trustee, Historical adopted a resolu-
tion providing that the assets acquired from Pioneer would 
be used to erect a building to be occupied by Historical and 
other societies,6 and contends that the court should have 
ordered Historical to comply with that resolution. In our 
opinion, the trial court did not err in limiting its decree to 
provisions Rimilar to those in Pioneer's articles. This limita-
tion eonforms to the wishes of the donors of the assets. In 
Yiew of our conclusion that Lelande's contentions cannot be 
Rttstained, it is unnecessary to discuss the motion of Pioneer 
to dismiss Lelande's appeal. 
The order is affirmed. The motion by appellant Los An-
geles Pioneer Society to remand the case to the trial court, 
the motion by appellant Lelande to dismiss the appeal of 
apprllant Los Angeles Pioneer Society, and the motion of 
apprllant J_,os Angeles Pioneer Society to dismiss the appeal 
of appellant Lelande, are, and each is, denied. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, .J., Edmonds, .J., and Spence, .J., 
concurred. 
CARTER, .J.-I dissent. 
I cannot agree that Pioneer was a charitable organization. 
The l.JOS Angeles County Pioneer Society was organized in 
1897 as an unincorporated association. In 1910, it was in-
"'' 1. To cultivate social intercourse and friendship among its members; 
'' 2. To collect and preserve data touching the history of Los Angeles 
County and the State of California; 
'' 3. To collect and preserve articles, specimens and material things 
illustrative or demonstrative of the customs, modes, and habits of the 
aforesaid times in said State; 
'' 4. To perpetuate the memory of those who by their labors and 
heroism contributed to make the history of said County and State; 
'' 5. And in furtherance of the aforesaid purposes, to receive, purchase, 
sell, hold, convey, encumber, lease, rent and maintain all kinds of prop-
erty, both real and personal; 
'' 6. To build clublwuses and do any and all acts, including but not . 
limitPd to the borrowing of money, as may be necessary and convenient 
for the promotion of the aforesaid purposes, 
''And it is further ordered [that the appointment is ineffective until 
Historical files an acceptance of the trusteeship providing that Historical] 
accepts the trusteeship for the specific purposes set forth above and not 
for any purpose which will result in any benefit to any private share-
holder, member or individual, and that said assets shall in no way be 
devoted to the carrying on of propaganda or otherwise attempting to 
influence legislation.'' 
"'l'he resolution provided that the funds would be used to erect a build-
ing, known as the Emma Stoltenberg Building, that it would be a home 
for the Historical Society, would have offices for Native Sons of the 
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eorporated as a nonprofit corporation under the existing laws 
of this state. At the time of incorporation, section 593 of 
the Civil Code provided that ''A nonprofit corporation may 
be formed by any number of persons, not less than three, for 
any lawful purposes such as religious, charitable, socrial, e'du-
cational, 1'CC1'ea,tiona~, cemetery or for rendering services, 
which do not contemplate the distribution of gains, profits or 
dividends to the members thereof, and for which individuals 
lawfully may associate themselves, subject to laws and regu-
lations applicable to particular classes of nonprofit corpora-
tions or lines of activity. The carrying on of business at a 
profit incidental to the main purposes of the corpora.ti,on and 
the d~istribution of assets to members on dissolution shaU not 
be deemed forbidden to nonprofit corporations." (Emphasis 
>tdded.) Its articles of incorporation provided "That the pur-
pose for which this corpomtiorv is formed is to cultivate soc·ial 
interco?Lrse and friendship among its members, to collect and 
preserve data touching the early history of Los Angeles 
County and the State of California, to collect and preserve 
articles, specimens and material things illustrative or demon-
strative of the customs, modes and habits of the aforesaid 
times in said State; to perpetuate the memory of those who, 
by their labors and heroism, contributed to make the history 
of said County and State; and in furtherance of said purpose, 
to receive, purchase, sell, hold, convey, lease, rent and maintain 
all kinds of property, both real and personal; to build club-
houses, and to do any and all other acts necessary and con-
venient for the promotion of the aforesaid purpose; and to 
exist as a social corporation under the proV?:sions of the laws 
of the State of Cal?fornia, covering such corporations, and 
not for pecuniary profit." (Emphasis added.) It was also 
provided that the corporation should exist for a period of 50 
years. 
Over the years, membership in the organization decreased 
until in 1941 there were less than 100 members; at the time of 
this action there were approximately 58 members still living. 
It would appear to be clear that the Pioneer Society was 
organized by a group of people who were brought together by 
their common interest in the history and historical relics of 
Ijos Angeles County and the state and that their purpose in 
flO organizing was to enjoy each other's companionship, to 
Golden West and the Native Daughters of the Golden West, and would 
have a meeting hall to be used jointly by the three foregoing organiza-
tions. 
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exchange reminiscenees ancl information. In Bogert, TrustR 
and Trustees (vol. IIA, § 380, p. 182 et seq.) it is pointed 
ont that "riifts to pro,·ide Rot~ia I Pnjoyment for the members 
of a private club or other limited gronp have been held not 
to be charitable. Probably this is on account of the narrow-
ness of their effect, rather than on account of the nature of the 
benefits to be derived. Good conversation, eating and drinking 
together, the playing of games, music, and other entertain-
ment no doubt add to the pleasure of life and to some extent 
maintain health. A gift for a clubhouse where all citizens of 
the community might have such social intercourse has been 
held charitable. But donations for the support of private or 
limited organizations of a similar type are lacking in the 
breadth of influence necessary to give them a public or chari-
table character." (Emphasis addetl.) In 1947, it was held 
in England that a trust to pay income to maintain an institute 
in London for people of \Velsh descent where lectures, study, 
entertainment, recreation and refreshment could be obtained, 
for the purpose of promoting the moral, social, spiritual and 
educational welfare of the Welsh people, is not devoted solely 
to charitable purposes (Trustees of Sir Howell Jones Wil-
liams' Trusts v. Inland Revenue Cornrs., 1 All Eng.R. 513). 
'fhe members of the Pioneer Society held meetings, gave 
picnics for themselves, held a meeting honoring the memory 
of the pioneers who discovered gold in California, erected 
a plaque to commemorate the site of the first school building 
at Inglewood, California, discussed the pioneers of California 
and (according to the majority opinion) ''recollected'' the 
activities of those pioneers. According to Webster (Int. Diet. 
2d eel.) the word recollect means ''to recover or recall the 
knowledge of; to call to mind; to remember.'' Taking into 
consideration the average age of 75 years of the members of 
Pioneer, it seems logical to assume that they were the children 
of these pioneers to whom they paid tribute and that their 
purpose in honoring them was not for the benefit of society at 
large, but to honor their own ancestors as well as to con-
solidate their fast dwindling ranks for their own social benefit. 
An organization of canary fanciers, rose horticulturists, or 
of those interested in purebred cattle, or purebred Irish 
Setters, or an association of breeders of Palomino horses could 
hardly be called charitable organizations even though an in-
cidental benefit might be said to result to society at large, or 
that portion of society also interested in the particular sub-
ject. Groups of people vitally interested in the same subject 
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mattm· enjoy <>aeh othrr 's eom pany heeause of that interest. 
anrl ofte11 form organizatiom; to diseuss, socially, their com-
mon intrrests. Any eflneational features of any of these organ-
izations are primarily intended for their own benefit, not for 
the benefit of the general public although nonmembers may 
improve their knowledge through the efforts of the organ-
ization. Such general benefit is purely incidental, however, 
to the primary purpose of the organization. I am convinced 
that this is the situation we have here. Mrs. Stoltenberg's 
first gifts to Pioneer, of which she was a member, were to 
enable the organization to purchase a building in which to 
hold its meetings which she attended; her last gift, by will, 
was to enable her fellow-members and friends to continue their 
meetings and social events. It is interesting to note that His-
torical, the organization appointed to act as trustee, was an 
organization existing at the same time as Pioneer during 
Mrs. Stoltenberg's lifetime. Had she desired Historical to 
have the benefit of her gifts, undoubtedly she knew of its 
existence and could have interested herself therein; had she 
desired only to benefit the people of this state through the 
collection of historical data and relies, undoubtedly she would 
have made gifts to both organizations. To my mind, her 
membership in Pioneer and her gifts to that organization, 
clearly support the social character of Pioneer. Another point 
clearly supporting the social character of the organization is 
that neither outsiders nor members of the general public 
were admitted to the meetings of the society. If an organiza-
tion is intended to benefit the general public, surely the gen-
eral public should be admitted to meetings for its benefit. 
In AbaLian v. Townsend Social Center, Inc., 112 Cal.App. 
2d 441 [246 P.2d 965], it was held that a social center whose 
articles of incorporation disclose that its purpose was to 
acquire a club building for the convenience of its members and 
other persons interested in the old age pension movement was 
a nonprofit corporation for the benefit of its members, and not 
a charitable corporation holding assets charged with a public 
trust. In Estate of Dol, 186 Cal. 64 [198 P. 1039], (a case 
holding Pioneer a charitable organization) it was pointed out 
that if the "only" object of an organization were to cultivate 
social intercourse and friendship among its members, it would 
be for the benefit of the members alone and would not be a 
charitable organization. I cannot agree that an organization 
may not be organized for social purposes with a common 
interest in an educational program without being classified 
May 1953] IN RE L. A. CoUNTY PIONEER SociETY 871 
[40 C.2d 852; 257 P.2d ll 
as a charitable organization. In Estate of Dol, 182 Cal. 159, 
163 [187 P. 428] (involving the French Hospital in Los An-
geles), it was held that "One of the essential features of a 
charitable use is that it shall be for the public benefit, either 
for the entire public or for some particular class of persons, 
indefinite in number, who constitute a part of the public. 
The persons to be benefited must consist of 'the general public 
or some class of the general public indefinite as to names and 
numbers.' (Estate of Coleman, 167 Cal. [212], 214 [Ann. Cas. 
1915C, 682, 138 Pac. 992, 993] ; Estate of Lennon, 152 Cal. 327 
[125 Am.St.Rep. 58, 14 Ann. Cas. 1024, 92 Pac. 870] .) " Here 
the members of Pioneer were definite and known. Here, as 
in Estate of Dol, supra, 182 Cal. 159, no one was entitled to the 
benefits of the society except those who became admitted as 
members and paid their dues. It was there held, in line with 
Stewart v. California Medical Etc. Assn., 178 Cal. 418, 419 
[176 P. 46], that "the declaration in the articles alone are 
insufficient to establish the character of the St. Helena Hos-
pital as a public charity, and the evidence of the manner in 
which it was conducted shows that it was not" and "the 
character of the institution is to be determined, not alone 
by the powers of the corporation as defined in its charter but 
also by the manner of conducting the hospital.'' That state-
ment is pertinent here. I have heretofore shown that this 
organization was conducted for the benefit of the members 
alone ; that its meetings were not open to the public; that its 
primary purpose was the social benefit to be derived by the 
members from their association with each other. In Estate of 
Henderson, 17 Cal.2d 853, 857 [112 P.2d 605], this court said 
"A bequest is charitable if: ( 1) It is made for a charitable 
purpose; its aims and accomplishments are of religious, edu-
cational, political or general social interest to mankind. 
(People v. Cogswell, 113 Cal. 129 [ 45 P. 270, 35 L.R.A. 2691 ; 
Estate of Merchant, 143 Cal. 537 [77 P. 475] .) (2) The ulti-
mate rreipients constitute either the community as a whole or 
an unascertainable and indefinite portion thereof. (People v. 
Cogswell, supra; Estate of Hinckley, 58 Cal. 457; Fay v. 
Howe, 136 Cal. 599 [69 P. 423] .) The charitable nature of 
an institution is determined on the same basis." (See In re 
La Societe Francm"se Etc. Mutuelle, 75 Cal.App.2d 770 [171 
P.2d 544].) 
In summary, and in applying the tests laid down in Estate 
of Henderson, supra, 17 Oal.2d 853, (1) Pioneer's aims were 
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to promote the social life of its members through their com-
mon interest in California history; (2) The ultimate recipients 
of any benefits to be derived from the organization were the 
members in good standing of the organization, not the com-
munity as a whole or an unascertainable and indefinite portion 
thereof. 
In a nonprofit corporation existing for the private benefit 
of its members, upon dissolution assets are distributed among 
the members (Corp. Code, § 9801; Brown v. La Societe Fran-
caise Etc. Mutnelle, 138 Cal. 475, 477 [71 P. 516] ; Abalian v. 
Townsend Social Cente1-, Inc., 112 Cal.App.2d 441, 449 [246 
P.2d 965]; 168 A.L.R. 956). This, I believe, is the result 
which should be reached here. It seems quite apparent that 
Pioneer was a nonprofit organization existing for the private 
benefit of its members who should, upon dissolution, receive a 
distributive share of the assets held by Pioneer. 
Assuming, however, only for the purposes of the following 
argument that Pioneer is a charitable organization, I see no 
valid reason why it should not be able to correct its deviation 
from its articles of incorporation. In other words, why should 
not Pioneer be permitted to continue to operate as a society 
and to revoke its former petition to dissolve the corporation? 
It is admitted in the majority opinion, that Pioneer's "aban-
donment of its trust was brought to light in the dissolution 
proceeding.'' Section 4691 of the Corporations Code pro-
vides that ''if the cause of action is a matter or act which 
the corporation has done or omitted to do that can be corrected 
by amendment of its articles or by other corporate action, such 
suit shall not be maintained 1tnless (a) the Attorney Gen-
eral, at least 30 days prior to the institution of suit, has given 
the corporation wr'itten notice of the matter or act done or 
omitted to be done, and (b) the corporation has failed, neg-
T'ected, or re[1tsed to institnte proceedings to correct 1:t within 
the 30-day period or thereafter fails to prosecute such pro-
ceedings." (Emphasis added.) The majority calls attention 
to the fact that during the time intervening after the inter-
locutory judgment, the order appealed from and the affirm-
ance by the District Court of Appeal, Pioneer's attention was 
repeatedly ealled to its status as a charitable organization. 
No mention is made of the fact that there was still to be made 
a determination by this court. In the event that this court 
had not decided that Pioneer was a charitable organization, 
it would have had the right to dissolve and distribute its assets 
among its members. Vlhy then, should it not be given notice 
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after tl1e final determination has been made, t.hat it must 
eonform to its articles or that a suceessor trusteE' will be ap-
pointed~ It is intf'resting to notf' that the title of section 
4691 is ''Conditions precedent: Notice affording opportunity 
for corrective action." The majority states that under section 
10207 of the Corporations Code, the attorney general has 
power to obtain the appointment of a successor trustee and 
that "there is nothing therein limiting the power of the .At-
torney General to cases where the assets of the charitable 
eorporation have been distributed.'' 'l'he assets, involved here 
have not been distributed but have been impounded pending 
the final determination of the issues involved. Section 10207 
provides that ''Each such [charitable] corporation shall be 
subject at all times to examination by the .Attorney General, 
on behalf of the State, to ascertain the condition of its affairs 
and to what extent, if at all, it may fail to comply with trusts 
which it has assumed or may depart from the general purpose 
for which it is formed. In case of any such failure or de-
parture the .Attorney General shall institute, in the name of 
the State, the proceedings necessary to correct the noncom-
pliance or departure. Except as specially approved by the 
.Attorney General such a corporation shall not accumulate 
income for a period longer than five years." (Emphasis 
added.) The section provides for "correction" of a non-
eompliance or departure; it does not prohibit a self-correction 
by the erring corporation. If Pioneer terminates its dissolu-
tion proceedings, and continues as it has done in the past, 
then, under the view taken by the majority of this court, it 
will be carrying on its charitable purposes and there is no rea-
son why a successor trustee should be appointed to administer 
Pioneer's funds. No authority is cited for the proposition that 
Pioneer may not be permitted to correct its deviation from 
its articles by withdrawing or revoking its dissolution pro-
ceedings nor have I found any such authority. The Restate-
ment of Trusts ( § 392) provides that (comment a) "A suit 
in equity can be maintained by the Attorney General to com-
pel the trustees of a charitable trust to perform their duties 
as trustees, or to enjoin them from committing a breach of 
trust, or to compel them to redress a breach of trust, or to 
appoint a receiver to take possession of the trust property; 
or to remove the trustees and appoint other trustees.'' There 
are, thus, several remedies other than the appointment of a 
successor trustee. 
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There was no bad faith on the part of Pioneer in voting to 
dissolve the corporation. It filed an action in declaratory 
relief and obtained a judgment to the effect that no trust of 
any kind was impressed upon its assets; it voted to dissolve 
and then petitioned the superior court for judicial super-
vision of the dissolution; it agreed that the attorney general 
might file a petition in intervention. Under the circumstances 
presented and in view of the fact that the applicable statutes 
do not prevent it, there appears to be no sound reason why 
Pioneer should not be permitted to revoke its dissolution pro-
ceedings and carry out the trust imposed by its articles since 
it is finally adjudged to be a charitable organization. 
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
Appellants' petitions for a rehearing were denied May 28, 
1953. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion that 
the petitions should be granted. 
The following opinions were then filed. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent from the order denying· appellant's 
petition for rehearing, and in view of the contention of appel-
lant in said petition that the effect of the decision of this 
court is to deprive it of its property without due process of 
law, I am constrained to comment on this contention. 
The record in this case presents one of the most outrageous 
examples of legalized larceny which has come under my 
observation. 
The Pioneer Society was organized as an unincorporated 
association; the evidence shows clearly, and without contra-
diction, that it was intended to be, and was, a purely social 
organization. As such an unincorporated association and 
social organization, it had the right, upon dissolution, to 
distribute its assets among its members. 
The record discloses that Pioneer has acted with the utmost 
good faith throughout. In the first instance, Pioneer sought 
a judicial determination of its charitable, or social, status. 
'l'he first judicial determination was that it was a nonprofit, 
noncharitable organization. A later judicial determination 
by the same court held it to be a charitable organization. 
Pioneer then sought to abandon its dissolution proceedings 
and, in accordance with the last judicial determination, carry 
on as a charitable organization. This it has not been permitted 
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to do. A majority of this court has declared that Pioneer 
is a charitable organization and that it may not be permitted 
to correct its so-called deviation from its articles of incorpora-
tion ; that its assets must be turned over to a successor trustee-
the Historical Society. As I pointed out in my dissenting 
opinion, this is a clear violation of the statutory provisions 
involved, which permit corrective action by a charitable organ-
ization which has deviated from its articles. Even if Pioneer 
is a charitable organization (which I am firmly convinced it 
is not) it has the right to abandon its dissolution proceedings 
and correct any deviation from its articles of incorporation. 
To refuse to permit such corrective action is, in my opinion, 
to deprive Pioneer of its property without due process of law 
under both the federal and state Constitutions. 
With respect to corporations, this court is empowered only 
to apply the statutory law of the state as it was written by 
the Legislature; it is not empowered to ignore the statutory 
provisions relating to corporations and effect a distribution 
of corporate assets as its collective whim may dictate. 
For the reasons stated herein, and in my dissenting opinion, 
r w·ould grant a rehearing and reverse the judgment. 
SCHAUER, J.-I concur generally in the reasoning and 
conclusion of Justice Carter. Particularly do I find no justi-
fication whatsoever for refusing to permit Pioneer to take 
the corrective action which it could not know it should take 
until this court had ruled that it could not rely on the prior 
final judgment or its charter from the state. 
Pioneer, by its articles of incorporation and the laws of 
California was not a charitable corporation; it never intended 
or pretended to be a charitable corporation; it paid taxes as 
a noncharitable corporation; it was adjudicated not to be a 
charitable corporation. With that background it instituted 
a proceeding for disf;olntion as it had a right to do. Its every 
act showK the good faith of the fine citizens composing it. 
Now this court rules that it is a charitable corporation and 
in the same judgment punishes Pioneer for instituting the 
lawful dissolution proceeding by stripping it of its assets and 
giving them to another; it refuses even to permit Pioneer, 
despite the authorization of the statute, to discontinue the 
dissolution proceeding and to carry out the trust which the 
court adjudges to exist. 
Such action in my view is contrary to fact, to law, to justice, 
to reason and to constitutional guarantees, 
